There is something attractive about combining the values of equality and responsibility, even though the view most commonly associated with doing so, of luck egalitarianism, is beset with objections. This article henc... more abstractThere is something attractive about combining the values of equality and responsibility, even though the view most commonly associated with doing so, of luck egalitarianism, is beset with objections. This article hence proposes an alternative approach to being a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian: one grounded on our valuable social practices of responsibility, rather than on a desire to mitigate the influence of luck on people's prospects. First, I argue that this practice-based approach better captures the very reasons that responsibility is significant for justice than does the prevalent approach among luck egalitarians: namely, the values of fairness, choice and respect. Second, I show that the remaining motivation of the luck egalitarian approach, of being ‘anti-luck’, is impoverished. I conclude by suggesting that this practice-based approach is better motivated and more palatable than existing forms of luck egalitarianism, even for those relational egalitarians who standardly criticise making egalitarianism responsibility-sensitive.

Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Egalitarianism, Relational Equality, Social Equality, and 1 more

Publication Date: 2015

Publication Name: Political Studies

Many states offer generous provision of fertility treatment, but this article asks whether and how such state funding can be justified. I argue that, at most, there is limited justification for state funding of fertil... more abstractMany states offer generous provision of fertility treatment, but this article asks whether and how such state funding can be justified. I argue that, at most, there is limited justification for state funding of fertility treatment as one good among many that could enable citizens to pursue valuable life projects, but not one that should have the privileged access to funding it is currently given. I then consider and reject reasons one might think that fertility treatment has a special claim to funding, over the other goods that might enable life projects. First, I deny that fertility treatment has a special claim to funding on the grounds that infertility is a disease or disability. Second, I argue that individuals do not have a right to assistance with the project of having a child of their own. Third, I deny that providing fertility treatment is a special case on the grounds that having children is good for society. However, there may be one exception: states have a reason to fund fertility treatment for same-sex couples that does not apply to heterosexual couples.

Political Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Bioethics, Distributive Justice, Reproductive Ethics, and 4 more

Publication Date: 2014

Publication Name: Journal of Applied Philosophy

Many liberal political philosophers regard virtue as a means by which to secure desired patterns of behaviour from citizens where institutions alone would not suffice. This article challenges that widely held view. Se... more abstractMany liberal political philosophers regard virtue as a means by which to secure desired patterns of behaviour from citizens where institutions alone would not suffice. This article challenges that widely held view. Sections 1 and 2 offer a revised version of the situationist challenge, made against virtue ethicists, to proponents of the liberal virtues. I argue that research in social psychology suggests that liberal virtues are a poor candidate, empirically speaking, for the instrumental roles they are introduced to fulfil. Section 3 proposes an empirically superior candidate to fulfil virtue’s instrumental roles, of social norms. Section 4 then defends the significance of the article’s empirical challenge to liberal virtue. I argue that the normative costs of social norms differ to those of virtues, and that, as such, liberal political philosophers often engage in irrelevant normative debates regarding virtue.

Political Philosophy, Virtue Ethics, Virtues (Moral Psychology), Social Norms, and Democracy and Citizenship Education

Publication Date: 2014

Publication Name: Journal of Political Philosophy

In Cohen’s vision of the just society, there would be no need for unequalizing incentives so as to benefit the least well-off; instead, people would be motivated by an egalitarian ethos to work hard and in the most so... more abstractIn Cohen’s vision of the just society, there would be no need for unequalizing incentives so as to benefit the least well-off; instead, people would be motivated by an egalitarian ethos to work hard and in the most socially productive jobs. As such, Cohen appears to offer a way to mitigate the trade-off of equality for efficiency that often characterizes theorizing about distributive justice. This article presents an egalitarian challenge to Cohen’s vision of the just society. I argue that a society where all internalized the egalitarian ethos would be one lacking equal respect among its members, in which certain groups lacked the grounds of self-respect. Section 1 defends equal respect and a form of equality of self-respect as values with broad-based appeal to egalitarians, and argues that a particular form of hierarchy would undermine both equal respect and the grounds of self-respect. Sections 2 and 3 reveal that just such a hierarchy would emerge in a society in which all had internalized the egalitarian ethos, in the case of both carers and the untalented. Thus, Cohen’s proposed society is shown to fail to unite equality and efficiency. Instead, Cohen’s society would be characterized by a lack of equality.

Political Philosophy, Egalitarianism, and G. A. Cohen

Publication Date: 2013

Publication Name: Politics, Philosophy & Economics

Distributive Justice, Responsibility, and Luck Egalitarianism

Publication Date: 2014

Publication Name: Economics and Philosophy

Without a convincing account of inequality's causes, egalitarians will continue to cede ground to the right, whose language of prudence and responsibility justifies further tightening of the welfare system. This paper... more abstractWithout a convincing account of inequality's causes, egalitarians will continue to cede ground to the right, whose language of prudence and responsibility justifies further tightening of the welfare system. This paper argues that advancing the cause of equality requires engaging with the right on the terrain of ideas and values.

Political Philosophy, Welfare State, Egalitarianism, Public Policy - Social Welfare Policy, and Luck Egalitarianism

Publisher: Wiley

Journal Name: Juncture

A blog post on IVF, at LSE's Forum for European Philosophy.

Bioethics and Bioethics Reproductive Technology